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PAYTON, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND THE
PRAGMATIST JUDGE:  IS PAYTON’S GOAL TO
PREVENT UNREASONABLE ENTRIES
OR TO EFFECTUATE HOME ARRESTS?
Christos Papapetrou*
“What concerns us is not what the historical facts which appear at
this or that time are, per se, but what they signify, what they point
to, by appearing.”1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two police officers arrive at a suspect’s home to execute
an arrest warrant.  The first police officer believes the suspect is not
home because he knows the suspect often takes walks at this time
in the evening.  The other officer, without this knowledge, sees the
suspect’s car in the driveway and the lights on in the living room,
and knows that according to an “objective” test this is enough to
believe the suspect is inside the residence.  If the police officers
enter the house (notwithstanding what the first police officer be-
lieves) should the objective test be enough to validate this entry?2
An empirical pragmatic3 approach to this problem would likely ar-
gue that if the facts satisfy the objective, reasonable test then the
entry should be upheld.  The opposing view would conclude that
“there can be no knowledge without belief.”4
This Comment examines an empirical pragmatic approach to
resolving this controversial issue arising from the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Payton v. New York.5  Further, it considers how a judge
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2008.  Many thanks
to Professor James Kainen for his helpful comments in the writing of this Comment.
1. OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
2. See Craig M. Bradley, Symposium:  Programmatic Purpose, Subjective Intent,
and Objective Intent:  What is the Proper Role of “Purpose” Analysis to Measure the
Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure?:  The Reasonable Policeman:  Police Intent in
Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 346-47 (2006) (considering a similar hypotheti-
cal, where one police officer knows from a distance that a plant is most likely not
marijuana and the other police officer thinks it is, and this was enough to constitute
probable cause for the search).
3. An empirical pragmatic approach advocates a more extensive use of social
science research to guide court decisions.
4. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 347.
5. 445 U.S. 573, 600-02 (1980) (holding that unless there are exigent circum-
stances the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entries into a suspect’s resi-
1517
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should approach a constitutional question when that question has
not yet been clearly decided by the courts.  In Payton, the Court
held that an arrest warrant implicitly carries with it a right to enter
a suspect’s home when there is “reason to believe” it is the sus-
pect’s residence.6  Courts since Payton have interpreted “reason to
believe” as incorporating anything from a simple belief on the part
of the police, up to a probable cause standard of proof.7  This Com-
ment questions how courts should think about this standard and
analyzes one approach put forth by Professor Matthew A. Edwards
in his article, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests.8  In
his article, Edwards proposes that courts could resolve this uncer-
tainty through empirical pragmatism and reliance on social sci-
ence.9  This Comment discusses Edwards’ proposal and the theory
of empirical pragmatism framed within the context of the Payton
standard.  Furthermore, it explores the consequences of relying on
empirical pragmatism in a constitutional setting, and suggests that
a proper approach to this question must have more substantive be-
ginnings because of the valuable interests involved.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s decision
in Payton10 and the lower courts’ application of the “reason to be-
lieve” standard.11  Part II examines Edwards’ proposed solution
that advocates the “Pragmatist Judge” and considers the various
criticisms raised by its opponents.  Part III posits that before a
court can correctly apply any empirical information, it needs to be
aware of the different interests involved.  This Comment proposes
that courts should participate in a legal narrative discussion to ar-
rive at a clear standard, rather than rely on pragmatism.
I. PAYTON V. NEW YORK
This section sets forth the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton
and considers the inconsistencies in applying the “reason to be-
lieve” standard.
dence for the purpose of arrest and that an arrest warrant and a reasonable belief by
the police officer could be enough).
6. Id. at 603.
7. See infra Part I.B (discussing how different courts have applied Payton).
8. Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77
WASH. L. REV. 299 (2002).
9. Id. at 302-04 (“[The Article] advances the cause of scholars who have called
for a more empirical and pragmatic approach to constitutional criminal procedure
adjudication.”).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ504.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-NOV-07 17:12
2007] PAYTON AND THE PRAGMATIST JUDGE 1519
A. What Does Payton Hold?
The question presented in Payton v. New York12 is whether a
police officer is authorized to enter a private residence to make an
arrest without a warrant.13  In response to this question, the Su-
preme Court held that, “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an ar-
rest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it
the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives
when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”14  The Court
created a two-prong inquiry to satisfy this standard.15  First, the po-
lice must have a reasonable belief that the residence is the suspect’s
home; and second, the police must have a reason to believe the
suspect is inside the residence at that particular time.16
Justice Stevens, writing the opinion of the Court, acknowledges
the New York Court of Appeals reliance on “apparent historical
acceptance”17 in reaching its decision to uphold warrantless arrests.
Justice Stevens examines the history behind the Fourth Amend-
ment, and then spends the majority of the opinion discussing the
Fourth Amendment principles the Court has always recognized.18
As Justice Stevens writes, “[a]lmost a century ago the Court stated
in resounding terms that the principles reflected in the Amend-
12. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  The issue before the Supreme Court was a challenge to a
New York statute that authorized police officers to make home arrests without any
warrant requirement. Id. at 574-75.  The Court’s main concern was distinguishing ar-
rests in the home from arrests in public that do not have a warrant requirement. Id. at
576.
13. The Fourth Amendment provides that, “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Edwards, supra note 8, at 336-37 (outlining the criteria required by the R
Payton standard).  Edwards focuses on his third requirement which creates the “rea-
sonable belief” standard that the courts have struggled to interpret. Id. at 337-38.
Edwards argues that it is crucial to understand what the police believe before they
enter.  He notes that, “it is typically unimportant in the following discussion whether
the suspect was indeed found in the residence.” Id. at 338.  Part III of this Comment
argues that an empirical approach could create situations where the police officer’s
reasonable belief becomes irrelevant.
17. Payton, 445 U.S. at 581.  Justice Stevens notes that the New York Court of
Appeals relied on historical acceptance derived from the common law, while the dis-
senters in the lower court noted that the history should not be determinative alone,
and that a “reasoned analysis” is always necessary when a grave constitutional ques-
tion is brought before the court. Id. at 581-82 (quoting Payton v. New York, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 324 (1978) (Cooke, J., dissenting)).
18. Id. at 581-87.
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ment ‘reached farther than the concrete form’ of the specific cases
that gave it birth.”19  The Court concretely states in Payton:  “It is a
‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment’ law that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.”20
B. Applying Payton Today
Courts have difficulty applying Payton because the Supreme
Court did not precisely define “reason to believe.”21  As a result,
courts applying this standard have developed different interpreta-
tions of what is required of police officers before they can enter a
suspect’s home.22  The crucial question is which standard of reason-
ableness satisfies the “reason to believe” language under Payton.
The majority of courts define the Payton standard as embodying a
level of reasonableness less than probable cause.23  These courts
interpret the standard as a “common sense approach,” analyzing
the totality of the circumstances that may give an officer reason to
believe the suspect is at home.24  In contrast to the majority of
courts, the Ninth Circuit has held that “police may enter a home
with an arrest warrant only if they have probable cause to believe
the person named in the warrant resides there.”25  The Ninth Cir-
19. Id. at 585 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
20. Id. at 586. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. R
21. Edwards, supra note 8, at 339-40. R
22. Id.
23. See United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We think it
more likely, however, that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other than
‘probable cause’ because it meant something other than ‘probable cause.’”); United
States v. Davis, 153 F.App’x 670, 671-72 (11th Cir. 2005) (following the interpretation
of the court in Magluta); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Payton standard requires less than probable cause); United States v.
Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is difficult to define the Payton
‘reason to believe’ standard, or to compare the quantum of proof the standard re-
quires with the proof that probable cause requires.”); Todosijevic v. County of Porter,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36753, at *16 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2005) (holding that “reasona-
ble belief” is not the same as the “probable cause” rule applied by the Ninth Circuit).
24. Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a
residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in
the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the
suspect’s dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry.”).
See also United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonable belief
is established by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the
circumstances.”); Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226; United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259,
264 (6th Cir. 1967).
25. United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the “‘reason to
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cuit refused to apply a lesser standard of reasonableness than prob-
able cause.
Courts have applied different factors in determining what consti-
tutes “reason to believe.”26  The most common factors include:  ob-
servation of the suspect, the presence of automobiles at the house,
lights on within the house, noises from within the residence, and
the time of day the police enter.27  Courts interpret these factors
differently, which has led to the current lack of clarity regarding
what constitutes “reasonable belief.”  Additionally, in situations
where there is only one factor present, the analysis of when to up-
hold a police entry becomes more questionable.28  The presence, or
lack of, these factors leads the police to different assumptions de-
pending on the situation.  Additionally, courts have held that the
police should consider whether the suspect is aware the police are
looking for them.  In these cases, the lack of the above factors al-
lows the police to assume the suspect is in the residence.29  For ex-
ample, having the lights off and hiding his car permits the police to
assume the suspect is inside the home.  Courts, however, have gen-
erally not applied the lack of factors as an indicator that the person
is hiding.30
United States v. Thomas is another example of a court’s unclear
application of Payton.31  In Thomas, the government argued that it
had satisfied the first prong of the Payton standard because it per-
formed an “investigation.”32  The government simply stated that
they investigated and were certain that the home was the defen-
believe’ or reasonable belief standard . . . embodies the same standard of reasonable-
ness inherent in probable cause”).
26. Edwards, supra note 8, at 341-42 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the R
common factors that have been used by courts in determining the “reason to believe”
standard).
27. See id. at 341-48.  Edwards explains how these different factors have been ap-
plied, and which provide more convincing evidence that the suspect is in the premises.
In each of these cases the court applied some combination of these different factors in
determining whether the police officers had a “reason to believe” the suspect is in the
residence.
28. See id. at 349-56 (providing numerous examples of cases where it is far from
clear that the police have established a “reason to believe” the suspect is home).
29. See Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 (acknowledging that in this circumstance the fac-
tors would be treated differently); see also Edwards, supra note 8, at 347-48 (describ- R
ing how these factors can be used in contrasting ways to satisfy Payton, and that it
creates a Catch-22 where the suspect may fall underneath Payton regardless).  This
example will be used in Part III.A.3 as a type of circumstance where the application of
an empirical approach would be questionable.
30. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 348. R
31. 428 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
32. Id.
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dant’s residence,33 and as a result they established more than a
“mere hunch, surmise, or suspicion.”34  The court, however, im-
plied that since Thomas was a parolee, his parole officer clearly
would have had his current address, and thus the government’s “in-
vestigation” was sufficient.35  As to the second prong, whether the
officers had reason to believe Thomas would be at home when they
executed the warrant, the court only considered the time of day
that the police entered the home.36  The court stated that “the early
morning hour was reason enough.”37
These cases exemplify how courts applying Payton have become
very deferential to the officer’s judgment in making factual deter-
minations about the suspect’s presence in the residence.  As Ed-
wards remarks, “[t]his deference seems to be a reflection of the
judiciary’s long-standing institutional concerns regarding second-
guessing police work.”38  The issue raised is whether the determi-
nations being made are those which courts have traditionally seen
as “police work,” or rather a lenient approach to police abuse.39
II. THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO PAYTON AND ITS CRITICS
This Part of the Comment examines Edwards’ pragmatic ap-
proach to Payton, as well as the various anti-pragmatic critiques.
33. Id.
34. Id. (“[W]e do not think the absence of testimony about where the marshals got
Thomas’ address is fatal to the Government’s claim of reason to believe Thomas lived
in the apartment.”).  To be clear, Thomas’ counsel also did not make a point to ques-
tion the marshal on the details behind the investigation, so the court may not have felt




37. Id. (quoting United States v. May, 68 F.3d 515, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (“The
logical place one would expect to find [the defendant] on that . . . morning was at his
home.”).  Edwards provides a similar example where the Massachusetts Supreme
Court upheld a police entry where an informant notified the police that he had seen
the suspect in his residence four days earlier, and there was no evidence he had left.
Again, the early morning timing of the police entry was sufficient to establish “rea-
sonable belief.”  Edwards, supra note 8, at 350-51 (citing Commonwealth v. R
DiBenedetto, 693 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1998)).
38. Edwards, supra note 8, at 348-49. R
39. Edwards considers these two different possibilities and is not concerned with
the increased deference to the police. See id. at 349 n.200.  He writes, “[a]nother
possibility is that these cases were decided correctly and that the Payton standard is
simply extremely lenient towards police behavior and is satisfied with little evidence
of presence.  Neither perspective weakens this Article’s critique that these opinions
lack sufficient factual basis.” Id.  This Comment argues that leniency towards police
behavior should be a primary concern because it leads to serious constitutional conse-
quences. See infra Part III.
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A. Edwards’ Empirical Pragmatism
Edwards suggests using empirical pragmatism to solve the
problems of applying Payton.40  He argues that “sound social sci-
ence” should guide the courts when applying Payton.41  Edwards
proposes that if judges were to adopt a method of judicial review
that “explicitly relies upon social-science research,” it would clarify
the issues faced by the courts when reviewing these police ac-
tions.42  Further, he argues that a database of home arrest statistics
should be created for judges to assist them in determining whether
it was reasonable for an officer to believe the suspect was at home
at the time of entry.43  He refers to this method of judicial decision-
making as one of “transparent adjudication”44 that will allow the
courts to move to more difficult normative questions.45
1. The Pragmatist Judge
Edwards relies on the model of legal pragmatism espoused by
Judge Posner.46  Edwards creates a “Pragmatist Judge,” based on
Posner’s model of pragmatism with the following characteristics:
(1)  Demonstrates respect for, but not blind adherence to, pre-
cedent; (2)  Is willing to look outside of traditional legal sources
for guidance in resolving truly novel or difficult cases; (3)  Uses
non-legal methods or information derived from “economists,
statistics, game theory, cognitive psychology, political science,
sociology, decision theory, and related disciplines,” to resolve
legal questions; (4)  Seeks guidance from empirical research
(hopefully conducted by invigorated law professors) to assist
with resolving legal issues; (5)  Attempts to come up with a “de-
cision that will be best with regard to present and future needs;”
(6)  Is willing to rely upon intuition to arrive at a decision when
neither traditional legal materials nor extralegal research or
40. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 304. R
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 375-85.
44. Id. at 387-88; see infra note 108 and accompanying text (outlining the concept R
of “transparent adjudication”).
45. See infra note 108. R
46. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LE-
GAL THEORY (1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]; see Edwards, supra note
8, 304-13 (describing the different elements of Posner’s empirical pragmatism and the R
pragmatism movement).
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methods suggest the proper outcome; (7)  Does not “look to
God or other transcendental sources of moral principle.”47
Edwards’ Pragmatist Judge reflects Posner’s general principle
that the “only sound basis for a legal rule is its social advantage,
which requires an economic judgment, balancing benefits against
costs.”48  Edwards focuses on this cost-benefit analysis in his ap-
proach to Payton.49  David Luban describes Posner’s pragmatism:
“[d]ecisions at law, judicial or otherwise, must be based on a realis-
tic, empirically informed, unsentimental, preferably quantitative
comparison of costs and benefits (not limited to monetary costs
and benefits however).”50  The pragmatist will make legal decisions
in accordance with the public’s well-being and will only look to
“doctrinal integrity” if it will improve that well-being.51
2. An Empirical Study of Home Arrests
Professor Edwards proposes that the United States Marshals
Service (the “USMS”) conduct an empirical study to be used in the
application of the Payton doctrine.52  Edwards chooses the USMS
because it is the most competent institution to research and create
an empirical study of suspect behavior,53 as it accounts for the ma-
jority of fugitive arrests in the country.54  Edwards writes, “the
Marshals Service’s unique fugitive-apprehension role gives it a
vested interest in determining the safest and most reliable methods
47. Edwards, supra note 8, at 313 (quoting POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note R
46, at 242, 249, 256).  Regarding the first two factors, Edwards acknowledges that
Posner’s pragmatism does not rely on “precedent, statutes, and constitutional text” in
the decision making process. Id.  The Pragmatist Judge “looks to sources that bear
directly on the wisdom of the rule he is being asked to adopt or modify.” POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS, supra note 46, at 249.  Further, the fifth factor proposes that the Prag-
matist Judge decides cases in line with what is best for the future. Id.  Posner writes,
“[a] pragmatist will be guided in this decisionmaking process by the goal of making
the choice that will produce the best results.” Id.  This formulation of the Pragmatist
Judge will be discussed in Part III of this Comment, specifically the question of what
is meant by the best results. See infra Part III.B.
48. Edwards, supra note 8, at 315 (quoting POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note R
46, at 208).  Edwards’ Pragmatist Judge could both choose and apply the rule that he
believed would have the best social advantage. See id.
49. Edwards, supra note 8, at 314-15. R
50. David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by
Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, OVER-
COMING LAW (1995)).
51. Id.
52. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 375. R
53. See id. at 375-76.
54. See id. at 375.
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for apprehending fugitives while preserving evidence for trial and
avoiding the suppression of improperly obtained evidence.”55
Edwards’ preliminary idea rests on the “common sense” factors
stipulated by the majority of Payton case law.56  The USMS would
study these factors and “analyze how reliable each factor is as an
indicator of presence, with the goal of creating a comprehensive
account of the weight of each presence factor, individually and in
concert.”57  This analysis, according to Edwards, would be “rather
tame as social science” because of the small amount of recurring
factors.58  Edwards concludes that this type of study would provide
police officers, prior to every entry, “a statistically sound basis for
determining whether there is reason to believe that the resident is
home.”59  Afterwards, when the court reviews the officer’s conduct,
it will be able to accurately evaluate the action based on this empir-
ical information, instead of relying on formalistic evaluations of the
“reasonableness” of the conduct.60
Next, Edwards proposes how courts should apply the empirical
data from the USMS study.61  He applies a framework developed
by John Monahan and Laurens Walker,62 termed “social
55. Id. at 376.  This argument, however, does not encompass all the interests that
the courts must consider.  Further, the USMS does not have an interest in protecting
constitutional rights.  The Payton standard does not only apply to fugitive suspects,
but to anyone subject to an arrest in their home.  These concerns will be addressed in
Part III. See infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the limited role of the
USMS).
56. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.  Edwards lists the following R
factors:
(1)  police or third-party sighting of, or contact with, the suspect at the resi-
dence some time prior to the attempted entry; (2)  light or noise emanating
from the residence; (3)  the presence of vehicles, connected or unconnected
to the suspect, at the residence; and (4)  the time of day the police seek entry
in combination with any known information regarding the suspect’s
schedule.
Edwards, supra note 8, at 376-77.  Edwards recognizes that these factors are not ex- R
clusive or could be further refined depending on what the USMS knows.
57. Id. at 377.
58. Id. at 378.
59. Id.
60. Id.  Edwards also recognizes that the study would encompass other circum-
stances as well.  For example, studying whether the police enter certain types of
homes more often than others.  He gives the example of motels versus single-family
homes. Id.
61. See id. at 378-81.
62. Id. at 378 n.359 (referring to various texts of Monahan and Walker discussing
how to apply empirical research to a legal context).
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frameworks,”63 as the correct way to apply emerging empirical
data.  Monahan and Walker define social framework decision mak-
ing as “the use of general conclusions from social science research
in determining factual issues in a specific case.”64  Edwards gives
the following examples where Walker and Monahan have used em-
pirical research as “social framework:”  eyewitness identification,
predicting future dangerousness of convicted felons, battered wo-
man syndrome, and child abuse.65  Edwards maintains that the
same approach could be used by courts66 with general data about
home arrests and suspect behavior used to determine whether of-
ficers had a “reason to believe” the suspect was present.67
Edwards notes, however, an important difference between the
Payton cases and the normal “social framework” context.68  The
Payton determination, “is arguably a mixed question of law and
fact reviewed de novo, not a finding of fact reviewed for clear er-
ror,”69 as the social framework examples are.  According to Ed-
wards, this is not fatal to the application of the “social framework”
context because in the Payton context, the legal conclusions are
based heavily on the facts of the case.70
In addition to laying out his framework for the Pragmatist Judge
and proposing that courts use the USMS database, Edwards also
engages in a thorough review of the different criticisms of legal
pragmatism71 and identifies two main categories.72  First, he dis-
cusses criticisms concerned with the certainty of the empirical
method itself,73 including:  whether social science data can ade-
63. Id. at 379 (quoting Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:  A
New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 563-70 (1987) [hereinafter
Walker & Monahan]).
64. Walker & Monahan, supra note 63, at 570.
65. Edwards, supra note 8, at 379-80 (citing Walker & Monahan, supra note 63, at R
563-67).
66. See id. at 380.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.  He compares it to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), which distinguished reasonable suspicion from probable cause. Id.
70. Id.  Edwards is not concerned about this distinction because a police officer’s
determination of “reason to believe” is so factually sensitive.  A court’s decision in the
Payton context, however, will always be a determination of when the police may enter
a person’s home to serve an arrest warrant.  Thus, a court cannot escape important
Fourth Amendment considerations.
71. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 318-34. See infra Part II.B examining these dif- R
ferent critiques.
72. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 318-19, 332-34. R
73. Id.  This Comment will not focus on these types of concerns.  As Edwards
writes, “[t]he first class of problems concerns the efficacy of utilizing specific social
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quately quantify the social interactions that the law governs;74
whether judges are competent to apply social science research;75
and whether law professors can handle the type of social science,
academic research that the Pragmatist Judge requires in order to
make those decisions align with the “best” social costs.76
Edwards’ second category deals with the criticism that pragma-
tism fails because it does not evaluate political, moral, or social
goals.77  For example, can pragmatism be applied to highly charged
constitutional issues?78  This criticism, which Edwards refers to as
banality,79 is that pragmatism is “empty of substance.”80  Many
scholars dislike pragmatism because of its refusal to prefer certain
science methods to assist with analyzing or resolving legal issues.” Id.  Edwards ac-
cepts the imperfections inherent in relying on social science research, but believes that
they do not “doom the entire endeavor of informing legal judgments with the most
reliable, current scientific or sociological data or theories available.” Id. at 321.
74. Id. at 319.  Edwards acknowledges that statistics and research founded on poor
data will be unreliable.  He argues that critics that raise this point are in fact making a
more normative argument:  that judges should not use social science research at all,
because “there is the notion that certain concepts embodied in the law—liberty, jus-
tice, equality, fairness, and due process—simply cannot be measured or fruitfully
compared.” Id. at 320.  Edwards describes this argument as the absolutist view of
legal rights, which would preclude the use of any empirical research in decisions in-
volving legal rights. Id. See also infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing R
Edwards’ conclusion that this will not be a serious obstacle in applying Payton).
75. Id. at 324-29.  This raises the issue of courts’ institutional competency to apply
empirical data to legal problems.  Edwards presents examples where courts have mis-
applied empirical research, but concludes that, “even scholars who have criticized the
judiciary’s handling of social science in the past have confidence that, with proper
effort, lawyers can handle such materials.” Id. at 327. See infra note 90 and accompa- R
nying text (arguing that judges already analyze these same factors when making Pay-
ton decisions).
76. Edwards, supra note 8, at 322.  Edwards discusses Posner’s different reasons R
for desiring increased empirical study by law professors.  Edwards cautions that “any
empirical scholarship by law professors must be tempered by an understanding of the
professional and institutional limitations on such a movement.” Id. at 323.  Edwards
is not as concerned with this criticism in his article because his proposal does not
require any data to be formulated by legal academics, but rather by the USMS. See
infra note 91 and accompanying text (concluding that this criticism is not applicable in R
the Payton context).
77. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 333.  This criticism is extensively examined in R
Part II.B and Part III of this Comment.
78. See id. at 318.
79. See id. at 328.
80. Id. at 329 (quoting Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory:  Its
Application to Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Dis-
tinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 328 (1996)). (“Pragmatism does not say what the good
is, how to live, what economic or political system to develop, or anything else of that
nature.”). Id.
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ends or goals.81  These critics argue that “pragmatism collapses on
its own weight because pragmatism calls for doing ‘what works
best,’ while pragmatists steadfastly refuse to take a position on
what is best.”82  Judge Posner answers this criticism, “by arguing
that factual inquiry may lead to common ground for those in the
center of a highly charged debate, even if those at either ideologi-
cal extreme may remain unconvinced.”83
While Edwards recognizes these as legitimate concerns, he ar-
gues that empirical pragmatism still provides answers in the con-
text of the Payton standard.84
3. Overcoming the First Criticism:  The Certainty
of the Empirical Method
Edwards addresses the first category of criticisms—the lack of
certainty in the empirical method itself—and concludes that it does
not present an obstacle in the Payton context.85  He suggests that
because the factors involved in studying home arrests are not very
complicated, the study would not involve complex scientific re-
search.86  Edwards states, “[n]o one could argue that once the
USMS data is collected and studied that there would be an intrinsic
problem with understanding the object of study, home arrests.”87
Edwards answers the criticism that empirical studies are inade-
quate to comprehend legal issues by arguing that the study would
81. See id. at 329.  This Comment argues that the pragmatic approach fails to ex-
amine what interests the rule of law is meant to protect. See infra Part III.B.1.
82. Edwards, supra note 8, at 330.  This is the argument of the Pragmatist Judge, in R
that he decides according to what is “best” for the future.  Edwards acknowledges
that this is a major criticism of pragmatism, and Posner himself admits that
“[p]ragmatism will not tell us what is best,” however, Posner believes there is a fair
degree of value among judges so that it will not be a serious problem. Id. at 330 n.134.
See infra Part III.B.
83. Edwards, supra note 8, at 332  (citing Richard A. Posner, On the Alleged “So- R
phistication” of Academic Moralism, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2000)).  Posner
defends pragmatism against the criticism of banality stating, “[t]he pragmatists’ hope
is rather that by abstaining from moral disputation and focusing instead on the facts—
by being, in short, a pragmatist—the judge or legislator may find some common
ground after all.” Id.
84. See id. at 333.
85. See id. at 381-84; see supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. R
86. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 381. R
87. Id.  This Comment proposes that it may be more difficult than Edwards sug-
gests to create a comprehensive empirical study, especially one that will reach conclu-
sions of law. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing how a pragmatic approach may not be
as helpful in certain, more difficult cases).
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be uncomplicated and clear.88  He also dismisses the argument that
judges may not be competent to apply this data to cases of law.89
Instead, he argues that judges are already very comfortable with
analyzing cases involving Payton.90 Additionally, Edwards argues
that the criticism that law professors would make errors conducting
empirical research is not applicable in this context because it is not
law professors, but rather the USMS that would conduct the re-
search.91  Edwards also addresses the problem of “causation,”92
and argues it is not a real concern because determining the pres-
ence of a factor (such as a vehicle in the driveway) does not cause
the suspect to be present.93  This is an important distinction for Ed-
wards, as he concludes, “[i]f one does not believe that the chal-
lenged action causes a result, then one may dispense with [the]
normative question of whether the result is desirable.”94
Edwards raises another important concern:  the USMS may not
have the correct motivation to participate in this type of study.95
The USMS is a law enforcement agency whose primary concern is
apprehending suspects, not protecting a suspect’s constitutional
rights.96  Edwards points out, however, that the USMS would have
a strong interest in embracing the study because it would prevent
unwarranted entries into private homes which would result in a de-
crease in future litigation costs.97  In addition, he argues that “Pos-
ner’s pragmatism calls for reconceptualizing the roles played by
various players in the legal system.”98  The USMS, therefore,
would adapt to a more innovative role.
88. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 381; see also supra note 74 and accompanying R
text.
89. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 382. R
90. See id.; supra note 75 and accompanying text (raising the argument that judges
may not know how to apply this data correctly).
91. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 382.  Edwards comments that because the USMS R
is performing the study it “circumvents the institutional barrier against empirical legal
research.” Id.  He advises that some form of legal academic oversight should take
place, though it’s not clear what that would entail. See id.; supra note 76 and accom-
pany text (discussing the role of law professors in performing empirical research).
92. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 382-83. R
93. Id.  The presence of these factors, car in the driveway, etc., correlates to the
presence of the suspect in the residence, but does not cause him to be there.
94. Id. at 383. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (arguing that this R
result more than correlates to a court’s analysis of these factors; the result determines
a person’s constitutional rights).
95. Edwards, supra note 8, at 383-84. R
96. See id. at 383.
97. See id.
98. Id.; see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the R
USMS and whether we want our law enforcement agencies to be “innovative”).
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4. Overcoming the Second Criticism:  Banality
For Edwards, the focus of the disagreement between pragmatists
and their critics99 is an initial disagreement about what is actually
disputed in these cases.100  Ronald Dworkin argues that the disa-
greement deals with which normative ends should be pursued.101
Pragmatists believe enough value consensus usually exists on the
ends, and the disagreement is about the correct means to achieve
those ends.102  Pragmatism may also be valuable in “revealing situ-
ations where doctrine or legal categories obscure a complete un-
derstanding of the underlying legal problem.”103  Where formalism
might categorize the problems too much, pragmatism offers an
“antidote for excessive abstraction.”104  Louis Menand critiques all
theory, pragmatism and non-pragmatism alike:105
It is sometimes complained that pragmatism is a bootstrap the-
ory—that it cannot tell us where we should want to go or how
we can get there.  The answer to this is that theory can never tell
us where to go; only we can tell us where to go.  Theories are
just one of the ways we make sense of our choices.  We wake up
one morning and find ourselves in a new place, and then we
build a ladder to explain how we got there.106
Menand further adds, “[t]he pragmatist is the person who asks
whether this is a good place to be.  The non-pragmatist is the per-
son who admires the ladder.”107
Edwards argues that pragmatism can overcome the banality con-
cern because it forces judges into a mode of “transparent adjudica-
tion.”108  For Edwards, this is the most valuable reason for applying
99. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 385-87.  Edwards addresses Ronald Dworkin as R
one of the main critics of pragmatism.  Dworkin objected to Posner’s pragmatism and
argued that empirical research cannot resolve debates over fundamental values. See
id.  Dworkin’s critique of pragmatism will be discussed in Part B of this section.
100. See id. at 386.
101. See supra note 99. R
102. Edwards, supra note 8, at 386. R
103. Id.
104. Id. at 387.  Edwards notes, however, that this may not be successful unless
pragmatism itself can offer a normative goal.
105. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 329 n.129. R
106. Louis Menand, Pragmatists and Poets:  A Response to Richard Poirer, in THE
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:  NEW ESSAY ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE
362, 369 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
107. Louis Menand, An Introduction to Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM:  A READER
xxxiv (Louis Menand ed., 1997).
108. Edwards, supra note 8, at 387-88 (citing Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Har- R
court, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000)
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pragmatism in the Payton context.  He recognizes that empirical
pragmatism is not a normative theory, but rather a theory that
forces the courts “to reveal the motivations for their decisions, by
stripping away the guise of ill-supported factual assumptions.”109
The benefits of “transparent adjudication” will be considered in
Part III.
5. A Theoretical Test of the USMS
In order to further expound on his theory and refute his critics,
Edwards provides several hypothetical situations, which we will ex-
amine here and revisit in Part III, to see what effect a pragmatic
jurisprudence may have on the elusive Payton standard.  In the first
example:  “[a] reliable and scientifically valid study of home ar-
rests110 indicates that the presence of a vehicle connected to the
suspect and light emanating from a residence indicates a 95%
chance that a suspect will be at home before 8 a.m. on a week-
day.”111  In this scenario, if the police were to enter a residence
before 8 a.m., a court would find they had satisfied the “reason to
believe” standard;112 otherwise, the court would require more than
a 95% certainty to satisfy Payton.113
In the second hypothetical, the police attempt to enter the sus-
pect’s home in the middle of the afternoon, when there are no ve-
hicles parked outside and no lights are on inside the home.114  The
[hereinafter Meares & Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication].  Meares and Harcourt
define the term “transparent adjudication” as “adjudication that expressly and openly
discusses the normative judgments at the core of constitutional criminal procedure.
Judicial decisions that address the relevant social science and empirical data are more
transparent in that they expressly articulate the grounds for factual assertions and, as
a result, more clearly reflect the interpretive choices involved in criminal procedure
decision making.”  Meares & Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication, supra.  This defini-
tion infers that the normative debate should occur simultaneously with a considera-
tion of relevant empirical information. See infra note 183 and accompanying text R
(proposing that where the only concern is transparency the courts will overlook the
normative aspect).
109. Edwards, supra note 8, at 388. R
110. Id. at 389.  Edwards assumes in these examples there are no flaws with the
empirical nature of the study and the resulting data. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.  What about a situation where the officer knows or has a fairly good reason
to believe the suspect is not home, but according to the factors present there is a 95%
chance he is in the home?  Should we care about the 95% probability then? See
Bradley, supra note 2, at 346-47.  Bradley argues that in certain circumstances a police R
officer’s subjective knowledge must be relevant to the court’s determination. See also
infra Part III.A.
114. Edwards, supra note 8, at 389. R
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empirical study states that these factors indicate less than a 2%
chance that the suspect is in the residence.115  Therefore, in this
situation a court would most likely find that the Payton standard
was not satisfied.
In the third scenario, a confidential informant reports that he
saw the suspect at his residence at 3 p.m. on a Saturday.116  The
police arrive at 7:30 p.m. the same day.  The suspect’s car is not
there, but cars they know belong to his acquaintances are parked
outside.  The lights are not on, but the police hear a television or
radio playing indoors.  The empirical study provides that these fac-
tors indicate an 18% chance that the suspect is at home.  Now the
court must ask, “[i]s 18% high enough for ‘reason to believe’?”117
It is in this third scenario where the banality problem arises.118
Edwards acknowledges that the empirical study may no longer be
useful at this point,119 as the court must first “explicitly hold what
level of certainty is required to satisfy Payton.”120  Once the courts
make this determination, then the “normative battle”121 can begin
regarding appropriate policy concerns.
6. Edwards’ Conclusion
Edwards acknowledges that a study of home arrests will not help
define “reason to believe.”122  The importance of empirical prag-
matism is that it forces the courts’ decisions into the open by “cre-
ating a process of transparent adjudication.”123  Only through a
comprehensive analysis of the underlying facts can we then engage





119. See id. at 390.
120. Id.  For example, Edwards suggests that if courts were to determine that a 25%
certainty will satisfy the Payton standard then it would resolve the dispute.  But what
does 25% exactly mean?  Should we care about the percentile because it means the
police may be right more often, or are we really concerned with what the officer
believes before he enters a person’s home?
121. Id.  The “normative battle” would be a discussion about how much we value a
specific constitutional right against the interests of law enforcement in arresting sus-
pects in their homes.
122. Id. at 392 (“No matter how accurate and comprehensive a study of home ar-
rests is, facts about suspect behavior will not answer the question of what the Payton
standard should mean.”).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 393 (“Until the facts are in, though, the debate cannot be joined.”).
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B. The Anti-Pragmatists:  Dworkin and Posner’s Best Results
One of the characteristics of Edwards’ Pragmatist Judge is that
he looks to the future and makes his decisions according to what
will produce the best results for society.125  Posner writes,
“[p]ragmatism will not tell us what is best; but provided there is a
fair degree of value consensus among the judges, as I think there is,
it can help judges seek the best results unhampered by philosophi-
cal doubts.”126  Dworkin calls this issue of the best results “the
standard pragmatist dilemma,”127 which is central to his criticism of
pragmatism.
Dworkin describes this dilemma:
Pragmatists argue that any moral principle must be assessed
only against a practical standard:  does adopting this principle
help to make things better?  But if they stipulate any particular
social goal—any conception of when things are better—they un-
dermine their claim, because that social goal could not itself be
justified instrumentally without arguing in a circle.128
Dworkin’s criticism of Posner is that he has taken a “moral
stance” himself and is predetermining the ends that society should
strive for.129  He remarks that Posner criticizes reflective people
and “assumes that their sole motive is to convince everyone else in
the world that they are right—time and again [Posner] says that
disagreement proves that moral theory has failed.”130
Dworkin’s own reflective approach to adjudication is his process
of “justificatory ascent.”131  He argues that most people have dif-
ferent convictions and only wish to try to explain their positions in
a way that “displays reflection, sincerity, and coherence.”132  A re-
flective person wishes to challenge his own theory and convictions,
and will put his normative beliefs to a rigorous analysis.133  For this
reason, a person turns to outside sources (including political,
125. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
126. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 46, at 262; see supra notes 99-109 and R
accompanying text (revealing Edwards’ response to this criticism).
127. Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1735
(1998) [hereinafter Dworkin, Darwin].
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1725 (“Posner could defend his strong thesis only with a substantive
moral theory of his own.”).
130. Id. at 1723 (citing POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 46, at 1656-57).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.  (“When their responsibility is particularly great—as it is for political offi-
cials—they might well think it appropriate to test their reflections against the more
comprehensive and developed accounts of other people, including moral and legal
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moral, and legal scholars) to try and justify his own convictions.134
This normative debate exists before a judge makes a decision and it
continues after his ruling.  The form of the debate provides the
most transparent, yet substantive, reasoning behind a decision.135
Dworkin’s “ascent” does not have a fixed ending in some perfect
moral order, because it cannot be stipulated beforehand where this
process should extend.136
Dworkin argues that pragmatists focus on the right “means”
while no one actually disagrees about the means, only the ends.137
He describes Posner’s pragmatism:  “[Posner’s] brand of pragma-
tism is empty because it instructs lawyers to attend to facts and
consequences, which they already know they should, but does not
tell them which facts are important or which consequences matter,
which is what they worry about.”138  The disagreement is often not
how to reach a certain result, but about the actual result itself.139
David Cole also critiques Posner’s pragmatism, but through the
lens of constitutional law:
[T]he problem with Posner’s approach is that it does away with
the animating idea of the Constitution—namely, that it repre-
sents a collective commitment to principles.  The genius behind
the Constitution is precisely that recognition that ‘pragmatic’
cost-benefit decisions will often appear in the short term to
favor actions that may turn out in the long term to be contrary
to our own best principles.140
Cole suggests that if we always knew what was best for society
and individuals, we most likely would never need a Constitution.141
Daniel A. Farber, in a critical review of Posner’s Problematics,
comments:
philosophers, who have devoted a great deal of time to worrying about the issues in
play.”).
134. See id.  Dworkin proposes that people turn to other sources of theory not be-
cause they expect to find the correct answer, but because they know that disagree-
ment exists, and the disagreement is important for testing their own ideas. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1723-24.
137. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431 (1997) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Reply].
138. Id. at 433.
139. See id.
140. David Cole, How to Skip the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 16, 2006, at
20 (reviewing Judge Posner’s most recent book: NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) (criticizing Posner’s “pragmatic”
approach to national security issues and constitutional civil rights)).
141. See id. at 21.
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Constitutional law is largely a matter of governance, but it is
also an important part of our national identity and culture.  The
Court needs to provide a convincing interpretation of our con-
stitutional history, telling a believable story about how it is car-
rying forward the project of American constitutionalism begun
by the Framers.  Thus, as with individuals, continuity with the
past is not simply a prejudice; it is a way of maintaining and
redefining national identity.142
Farber remarks that Posner ignores this independent factor of
history as a consideration in the decision-making process.143
III. A MORE IMAGINATIVE APPROACH TO EMPIRICAL
PRAGMATISM AND PAYTON
The Pragmatist Judge cannot adequately capture the American
jurisprudence identity because he does not value the importance of
normative disagreements.  In contrast to Edwards’ argument that
pragmatism can lead to “transparency,” pragmatism creates the
danger of arbitrary, bright line rules for judges based on a vague
concept of “what is good for society.”  This Comment cautions that
a proper judicial analysis is aware of these traps, and is willing to
confront the normative disagreements that have always existed in
judicial debates.  These normative disagreements have led to an
American legal narrative that courts have a duty to comprehend.
A. Why Pragmatism Will Not Clarify Payton
This section examines difficulties in creating a reliable empirical
study, revisits Edwards’ theoretical scenarios, and finally addresses
other situations where a pragmatic approach may not be helpful.
1. The Difficulties in Creating a Reliable Study
Edwards comments that it would not be difficult for the USMS
to create an accurate and reliable empirical study of home ar-
rests.144  While the presence factors145 seem clear enough, it is
questionable whether the USMS could quantify how much a police
142. Daniel A. Farber, Book Reviews:  Shocking the Conscience:  Pragmatism,
Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, the Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 675, 686 (1999).
143. See id.
144. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  Edwards remarks that the analysis
would actually be rather “tame” and that the factors considered are fairly
straightforward.
145. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the common sense fac-
tors outlined by Payton case law).
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officer relied on each one of these factors in making a “reason to
believe” determination.  Most courts have relied on an overarching
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.146  Edwards also notes
that the USMS is the “ideal law enforcement partner for a study of
home arrests”147 because of its unique role in apprehending fugi-
tives.148 Payton, however, encompasses more than fugitives.
Courts have recognized that a fugitive—a person who knows he is
being pursued by the police—will act differently than a person who
is not a fugitive.149  The USMS would have to create separate stud-
ies about the significance of factors in both fugitive and non-fugi-
tive cases.150
The USMS study would also not be limited to those common
sense factors discussed in Part II.B.151  The study would have to be
refined as courts encountered new and unexpected circumstances.
For example, Edwards speculates that learning the amount of time
from informant contact to the time of entry could be important or
that the nature of the offense may play a role in the determination
of whether the fugitive is present in the residence.152  These are
only a few of the factors we could consider in determining whether
it is reasonable to assume a person is home.
Edwards’ analysis does not really consider that Payton cases re-
sult in a police entry into the home, which courts should consider a
graver consequence.  Should a court be concerned with how often
officers appear to be right, or what the police officer actually rea-
sonably believed at the time?  Home entries are different from sit-
uations where the suspect is stopped in public by police officers.153
146. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. R
147. Edwards, supra note 8, at 375. R
148. See id. at 376; see supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the compe-
tency of the USMS because of its unique role in law enforcement).
149. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.  In U.S. v. Magluta, 44 F.3d R
1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995), the court recognized that the factors would be treated
differently where the suspect was aware of the police officers.  Edwards also recog-
nizes that it creates a problem for the suspect, and it is not clear how the USMS would
take this into account in creating the study. See infra note 177 and accompanying text R
(examining how a pragmatic approach may not correctly guide an officer where he
believes a suspect is aware the police are searching for him).
150. This would force the police and the courts to review how the empirical evi-
dence should be applied in the two different scenarios.
151. Edwards, supra note 8, at 377; see supra Part II.B. R
152. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 377 (providing these two as examples, “[b]ut in R
one form or another, the list above contains most of the commonly used indicators of
suspect presence”).
153. See id. at 377-78 (comparing the factor analysis to police stops in public, and
how it would also work the same way in Payton contexts because enough of the same
factors appear in each case).  The Supreme Court in Payton noted the significant dif-
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The unique factors that may not be expressed in the USMS study,
and only exist in particular cases, are vital to the Payton context.
Edwards’ conclusion that “the event being studied—the presence
of a suspect—is rather uncomplicated” may be more complicated
because of the many different situations that could arise.154
Edwards proposes that the home arrest study will allow the
courts “to honestly evaluate” police action instead of relying on
“formalistic evaluations.”155  If courts always rely on the study,
then what is left for the courts to review?  If the judge assumes the
police officer was aware of the USMS study and relied on those
empirical statistics in effectuating a Payton arrest, then the judge
will always validate those actions.  Further, if police officers are
aware of the study, they could make entries on the pretext of rely-
ing on the study even though they knew it was not a reasonable
entry.156  The danger is that it will create a “good-faith” exception
to Payton where police action will always be upheld because of the
empirical study.
The courts must also consider that the Payton determination is
not only a finding of fact, but also results in a conclusion of law.157
Whether there is “reason to believe” a suspect is in the residence is
clearly a factual question, yet it ultimately results in important con-
sequences involving a person’s constitutional rights.  This makes
the determination distinctly different from, for example, studies on
child abuse, battered woman syndrome, and eyewitness identifica-
tions.158  These studies do not result in a determination of a per-
son’s constitutional rights.  Edwards dismisses the issue of
causation because the determination of these factors does not
cause the suspect to be present at the home.159  Thus, he dismisses
any normative issues regarding the consequences.160  While the
ference between arrests in public and arrests in a person’s home because of the histor-
ical, legal protection afforded a person in his home. See supra notes 12-20 and R
accompanying text.
154. Id. at 381.
155. Id. at 378. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
156. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 343 (“While police intent may be difficult to R
ascertain and easy to fabricate, there are numerous cases in which it is, or should be,
the key to the outcome.”).
157. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.  Edwards concedes this point,
but does not believe that it is a serious obstacle because the legal conclusions the
courts reach in Payton are so heavily dependent on the facts of the case. Id.
158. See id.
159. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. R
160. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. R
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study will not cause the effect, it will have a serious result that de-
serves a debate of the knowledge and belief a court requires.
Moreover, conducting the empirical study may not be a role that
we want to entrust to a law enforcement agency.161  Edwards ar-
gues that pragmatism welcomes a changing of the roles played by
institutions within the legal system.162  How the USMS addresses
these different legal interests, however, is a different question from
whether the USMS should be concerned with interests that would
interfere or conflict with its law enforcement capabilities.163  Also,
it is controversial whether it is prudent to introduce a seemingly
judicial role into an executive law enforcement agency.  More im-
portantly, this is a normative question regarding the role of law
enforcement agencies.  This debate would have to be much more
extensive before courts allow an executive agency a more expan-
sive legal role.  The next section argues that even if we accept that
the USMS is a capable institution for this task, difficulties still exist
when using a pragmatic approach.
2. Revisiting Edwards’ Theoretical Cases
Edwards offered examples of how the USMS study could be ap-
plied in practice.164  In the first scenario, the USMS study tells us
that there is a 95% certainty that the suspect is in his home, there-
fore police entry will always be upheld by the courts in this particu-
lar case.165  In the next example, there is only a 2% chance
according to the study;166 therefore, a court would strike down the
police action under the Payton standard.167  In the third hypotheti-
cal, the problem of interpretation arises as the empirical statistics
161. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. R
162. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 384; see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying R
text.
163. The USMS is a law enforcement agency that apprehends fugitives.  Thus, it is
not as much “reconceptualizing” its legal role, as it is expanding its role to give it the
responsibility to formulate the legal justifications for those arrests.
164. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three R
different hypothetical scenarios Edwards examines, and how the empirical evidence
should be applied.  In these scenarios, we are assuming the study of home arrests is
accurate and reliable.
165. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.  In this example the study pro- R
vided that where there were lights on in the house, a car parked in the driveway, and
it was before 8 a.m., there was a 95% certainty that the suspect was home.
166. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.  In the second scenario the R
study provided that where the police entered in the afternoon, and there were no
lights on or vehicles present, there was only a 2% chance that the suspect was in the
residence.
167. Id.
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tell us that there is an 18% certainty that the suspect is home.168
The significance of the third hypothetical for Edwards is that the
court must now ask, “[i]s 18% high enough for ‘reason to be-
lieve?’”169  The court, however, cannot answer this question until it
decides exactly what “reason to believe” means.170  In the difficult
situations, therefore, pragmatism does not offer an alternative so-
lution but rather disguises the normative question as an empirical
one.  The USMS study only brings us full circle to our original
starting position.  Courts must first resolve what Payton requires as
its standard before an empirical study can be applied correctly.
Empirical evidence, such as the USMS study, could be a valuable
source of information to help guide the courts in clear cases.  There
are circumstances, however, where the statistics may not help bring
us any closer to a solution.  The following section discusses some of
these scenarios.
3. Difficult Cases for an Empirical Approach
It is extremely rare for courts to invalidate an entry based on
Payton.171  There are many cases where the police had almost no
reason to believe the suspect was home and the courts still upheld
the police entries.172  One example of the few cases where the court
168. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.  In this last example, the R
USMS study informs us that if police act on an informant’s tip hours later the same
day, and the suspect’s car is not there but other vehicles that belong to his associates
are parked outside, and there are no lights on but the police hear a television or radio
playing then there is an 18% chance that the suspect is in the residence.
169. Edwards, supra note 8, at 389; see supra note 117 and accompanying text. R
170. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.  Edwards concedes that the R
study may no longer be useful at this point and that the courts must decide where the
line should be drawn.  He stipulates that if the courts decided on a 25% threshold this
would allow them to consistently apply Payton.  Once the courts settled on, for exam-
ple, 25%, then the normative questions regarding policy can be argued.  The problem
is that setting a 25% standard is a normative question.  There is a risk these percen-
tiles will become bright lines for applying Payton, and will have the unwanted result of
moving the courts away from that normative debate.  A court will not be concerned
with what “reason to believe” should mean, where the USMS study informs them of a
more than 50% certainty the suspect was at home, regardless of the actual knowledge
and beliefs of the police officers.
171. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 355-57 (providing a few examples where police R
entries have been invalidated under Payton).
172. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (In U.S. v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, R
(D.C. Cir. 2005), the court had hardly any facts at all and still upheld the police ac-
tions under the Payton standard.); see also supra note 37 (In U.S. v. May, 68 F.3d 515,
516 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court upheld a police entry where all the police did was enter
early in the morning, and the court found that to be enough.  This illustrates the very
low threshold in applying Payton.).
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did not find the arrest valid under Payton is People v. Jacobs.173
There, the police attempted to arrest Jacobs at home in the middle
of the afternoon.  His eleven-year-old daughter answered the door
and told the police that her father would be back in an hour.  The
suspect’s vehicle was not present and there were no other factors
on the record that would lead police to suspect he was hiding inside
the house.174  The police relied on the fact that Jacobs did not have
a day job to determine it would be reasonable to believe that he
would be home during the day.175  This decision is surprising be-
cause courts almost always side with the police in these cases.176
A pragmatic approach fails because it cannot account for subjec-
tive inquiries which might be necessary to reach an accurate “rea-
sonable belief.”  Clearly all relevant empirical evidence would be
valuable in these cases, especially when different courts analyzing
the same sets of factors arrive at different conclusions of law.  How
will an empirical approach, however, also take into account the
reasonableness of the individual police officer’s actions?  For ex-
ample, in Jacobs, if the police had argued that it is unreasonable to
believe that an eleven-year-old would be home alone, could the
study take that into account?  What if the police believed the
daughter was lying and Jacobs was hiding inside?  These questions
indicate that a more case-sensitive approach is required.  Should
courts rely on the study because we want the police to be right as
often as possible?  Or should courts be more concerned that in
every individual instance a police officer can articulate the reasona-
bleness of his actions?  Within the constraints of an empirical study
it may be difficult to answer the latter question.
In addition, the pragmatic approach may not be useful in “fugi-
tive” cases177 because the absence of factors creates a presumption
that the suspect is hiding within the residence.178  An empirical ap-
proach would be difficult to apply to these circumstances, as the
police could make a negative inference, from the lack of factors,
173. 729 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1987).  This case was actually decided under §884 of the
California Penal Code, which provides for a similar standard to the Payton rule, but it
is an example of where a court has invalidated a police entry to execute an arrest
warrant under the “reason to believe” framework.
174. See id. at 761.
175. See id. at 760-61.
176. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005); U.S. v. May, 68
F.3d 515, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
177. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  Edwards acknowledges how, in
these circumstances, police can infer from the absence of these factors that the suspect
is within the residence.
178. Id.
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that the suspect is inside.  Police entries could always be justified in
every circumstance where officers believe the suspect is hiding. In
these types of situations, “the subjective knowledge, recklessness
(also a subjective concept), or negligence as to facts on the part of
the police is certainly a legitimate subject for inquiry.”179  This ar-
gument is qualified by the requirement that the police believe in
the objective evidence.180  There will be situations where a police
officer may know that a suspect is home or not home regardless of
anything the empirical evidence suggests.181  Bradley very point-
edly comments that “[r]eason to believe should be read literally to
require a belief based on reason.”182  While valid and reliable em-
pirical research on home arrests would be a valuable source of in-
formation, there are open questions as to its application.
B. Practical Wisdom to Replace a Pragmatist Judge
1. A More Substantive Method of Adjudication
Courts applying an empirical study to determine if Payton has
been satisfied would, at the same time, stipulate that the objective
determination protects all the necessary interests involved.  The
application of the USMS study implies that a person’s constitu-
tional interests are only triggered when below a certain arbitrary
percentile.
Most people would not disagree with the objective facts of a
valid and reliable empirical study.  Edwards’ hypothetical involving
a 95% certainty is a very persuasive case for adopting an empirical
approach to Payton.  In this manner, Edwards is correct that the
USMS study would create transparency in the judicial decision-
making of the courts regarding Payton.  The high level of
probability, however, does not tell us the particular reasons why
the officer believed the suspect was at home, or whether what the
officer believed about the presence of the suspect was reasonable.
While it is important to encourage “transparent adjudication”183 in
judicial decisions, it must accompany a substantive method of adju-
179. Bradley, supra note 2, at 348. R
180. See id. at 357 (“The notion that probable cause requires not only the existence
of objective facts, but also that the police believe those facts, is as ancient as the
concept of probable cause itself.”).
181. See id. at 370.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 108-09 (discussing “transparent adjudication” and how it R
should be applied in this context).
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dication.  Transparency is very desirable but it needs to reflect
Dworkin’s “justificatory ascent.”184
2. Introducing a Legal Narrative
One response to Menand’s critique of theory185 is that we need
to be continually asking whether this is a “good place to be,” fully
aware of how we ascend the ladder.  Both the means and ends are
intricately important aspects of a judicial discourse.  Encouraging a
discourse about the disagreement in the ends to be achieved or the
interests to be protected is a valuable form of reasoning.  Dwor-
kin’s “justificatory ascent” is a form of legal interpretation that al-
lows a transparent view of the existing disagreements.  The form of
reasoning applied is more important than being able to stipulate
what is “best for society.”186  When deciding a Payton case, the
court should require an analysis that takes into account, on a case-
by-case basis, the specific articulated reasons behind the officer’s
actions.  The Pragmatist Judge, because he is “forward-looking,”187
lacks the imaginative capability to recognize that empirical evi-
dence, when taken alone, will only hide the actual substantive
issues.
A judge needs to do more than a balancing of costs (as the court
would do here by applying the USMS study) as the decision pro-
cess “requires an effort, guided by text, precedent, and history, to
identify the higher principles that guide us as a society.”188  The
decision-making process should comprehend a legal narrative and
it is a judge’s particular role to contemplate this narrative through
“text, tradition, precedent, and reason.”189  Judges should strive to
apply principles, which are more important than a cost-benefit
analysis that involves the “weighing of imponderables.”190  For ex-
184. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. R
185. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. R
186. See Dworkin, Darwin, supra note 127, at 1734-35 (“We cannot evaluate a mo- R
rality by asking whether it helps a society to ‘survive,’ because the morality a society
adopts will almost always determine not whether it survives, but the form in which it
does so.”).
187. Id. at 1735 (concluding that moral pragmatism is an empty theory because “it
encourages forward-looking efforts in search of a future it declines to describe”).
188. Cole, supra note 140, at 21-22. R
189. Id. at 22.
190. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
David Cole quotes Harlan’s dissent where he discusses the constitutional significance
of interpreting the due process clause.  Justice Harlan says:  “The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are
the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
The tradition is a living thing.” Id.
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ample, in the Payton context, a judge is considering whether to val-
idate the government’s entry into a person’s home to make an
arrest.  The constitutional interests require a judge to contemplate
that legal narrative which in this context would include the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence of the court.  As Justice Harlan once
said, “[n]o formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.”191  Dworkin’s “justificatory ascent” is an
attempt to embrace both judgment and restraint as integral to a
legal narrative.
3. Applying a Legal Narrative
This section suggests that a judge should feel responsible to in-
terpret a legal narrative192 that is both transparent and fully reflec-
tive (not simply forward-looking) because it provides a clearer
understanding of the law.  This is especially true in constitutional
law because of the insight that it gives to the legal rule or principle.
A legal narrative recognizes a culture and identity that is inherent
in the law-making process.
Posner disagrees193 with Dworkin’s definition of pragmatic adju-
dication, which is:  “[t]he pragmatist thinks judges should always
do the best they can for the future, in the circumstances, unchecked
by any need to respect or secure consistency in principles with what
other officials have done or will do.”194  Posner argues that this is
the definition of a positivist judge and not a pragmatic judge.  Pos-
ner’s definition of a pragmatic judge is one that “always tries to do
the best he can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any
felt duty to secure consistency in principles with what other offi-
cials have done in the past.”195  Posner sees the Pragmatist Judge as
being unchecked by a duty to authority while Dworkin interprets
the Pragmatist Judge as one completely unrestrained.  For Posner,
“[the judge] is concerned with securing consistency with the past
only to the extent that such consistency may happen to conduce to
producing the best results for the future.”196  This statement is not
191. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.
192. While the idea of a legal narrative seems ingenuous to applying law, there is an
important historical and legal progression of the law that jurists should interpret.
193. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1996) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication].
194. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 161 (1986).
195. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 193, at 4.  Posner argues that the
distinction between the positivist judge and the pragmatic judge  is that the positivist
judge simply makes decisions for the purpose of securing consistency, while the prag-
matist judge only does so if it will be better for society. Id.
196. Id.
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very reassuring, as it implies that a judge will only value the legal
narrative when it is in line with his own views as to what is best.197
Posner’s Pragmatist Judge does not feel a responsibility to the
legal history that has preceded him.  Posner does not go so far as to
cast out the Constitution, but notes that the Pragmatist Judge, “re-
gards precedent, statutes, and constitutions both as sources of po-
tentially valuable information about the likely result in the present
case and as signposts that must not be obliterated or obscured gra-
tuitously, because people may be relying upon them.”198  This is a
troublesome description of our legal history and the value of the
Constitution.  In Posner’s view, the only reason the Pragmatist
Judge should hesitate before discarding them as authorities is that
it may be possible that someone is relying on the Constitution.  A
judge, however, should consider more than reliance when ruling a
law unconstitutional, or deciding against established legal prece-
dent.  Posner also reflects (Dworkin would likely say he uncon-
sciously reflects) the concept of a legal narrative in the preceding
description when he refers to these “authorities” as signposts.199
The purpose of a signpost is to provide direction, and most prudent
travelers would be wary to disregard them as cavalierly as Posner.
Posner’s pragmatism can be contrasted with a different descrip-
tion of pragmatism that is not justified by achieving the best re-
sults, but only that it is the best current option.200  In the Payton
context, this means the USMS study is not providing us with a way
out, but only a temporary remedy.  Edwards acknowledges the fact
that empirical pragmatism will not provide us with a normative an-
swer to the problem.  Edwards’ pragmatism, however, also creates
a danger that the judge will cease to be concerned with any norma-
tive questions.201
197. This is the argument that pragmatism is an empty theory because it returns
you full circle to the question of how a judge can make these determinations without
answering normative questions. See supra Part II.B.
198. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 193, at 5 (“[B]ecause the pragma-
tist judge sees these ‘authorities’ merely as sources of information and as limited con-
straints on his freedom of decision, he does not depend upon them to supply the rule
of decision for the truly novel case.”).
199. Id.
200. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY 104 (1998) [here-
inafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE] (“To provide an institutional excuse, an insti-
tution must be justified in a stronger way by showing that it constitutes a positive
moral good.  A pragmatist argument, by contrast, need only show that it is not much
more mediocre than its rivals.”).
201. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 304 (commenting that empirical pragmatism will R
not determine when Payton arrests will be constitutional, but will clarify the courts’
review of these cases).
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Pragmatism as a general theory includes a wide variety of per-
spectives embodying differing aspects of society and the law.202
Edwards, for example, discusses Aristotle’s concept of practical
reason.203  Daniel Farber also discusses the general nature of legal
pragmatism:  “[pragmatism] is part of a loosely connected collec-
tion of antifoundational views, a category that includes believers in
Aristotelian practical reason, some feminists [sic] theorists, adher-
ents to literary theories such as hermeneutics and deconstruction,
and students of the philosophy of language.”204  All of these de-
scriptions touch upon the concept of a “practical reasoning,” which
the Pragmatist Judge too easily overlooks when depending closely
on empirical evidence.
Aristotle’s concept of “phronesis,” is best defined as “a form of
practical wisdom capable of respecting the singularity of situations
as well as the nascent universality of values aimed at by human
actions.”205  Phronesis is a mode of interpretation that is “forward-
looking” but also recognizes a responsibility, or duty, to higher
principles, as in our case an ever-developing legal system.
A legal narrative is an incorporation of practical wisdom and a
hermeneutic approach to our legal history and principles.  Richard
Kearney defines a hermeneutic approach in a literary context as
“the view that the retelling of the past is an interweaving of past
events with present readings of those events in the light of our con-
202. Id. at 305 n.17 (discussing how legal pragmatists are in fact very diverse, and
that “they share a general theoretical perspective that weds Aristotle’s concept of
practical reason with various aspects of, among other things, nineteenth-century utili-
tarianism, American pragmatism and neopragmatism, and postmodern, continental
philosophy.”).  Edwards describes pragmatism as a combination of Aristotle’s “practi-
cal reason,” and yet the pragmatist judge, I would argue, is removed from this concept
of Aristotelian “phronesis” (practical wisdom).
203. See id.
204. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:  Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-
First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 167-68.  Edwards’ Pragmatist Judge and Pos-
ner’s empirical pragmatism do not take into account this concept of practical reason,
which does not rely solely on the empirical evidence presented, but is a hermeneutic
interpretation.
205. RICHARD KEARNEY, ON STORIES 143 (2002).  Richard Kearney, a professor of
philosophy at Boston College and University College Dublin, advocates phronesis as
a mode of understanding history, and  distinguishing history from fiction.  It is op-
posed to the concept that we cannot really know what is true, and therefore we must
trade in historical truth for “pragmatic effectiveness.”  Moreover, it is not simply
enough that a historical account is “right if it works.” Id. at 145.  While Kearney dis-
cusses phronesis as a form of reasoning in a literary and historical context, “practical
wisdom” is a desirable form of interpretation for a judge that must review the “au-
thorities” of the past and present in order to better understand the problem
presented.
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tinuing existential story.”206  This definition of hermeneutics could
be applied to judicial decision-making because it recognizes the
past legal history (the authorities that Posner’s pragmatic judge
only cursorily reviews) in the practical context of the present.  This
approach moves beyond a formalistic argument for originalism,
and recognizes its effect on a continuing legal narrative.  Moreover,
it is an informed mode of adjudication that fully recognizes the ex-
istence and importance of normative disagreement.  If we now re-
turn to Posner’s general principle (which Edwards relies upon) that
the only reason for a legal rule is its “social advantage,”207 we real-
ize it is not concerned with the practical wisdom that provides a
more judicious approach.  Luban comments that in Brandeis’ view,
“this unique combination of abstract reasoning ability and empiri-
cal keenness, debarred from the ivory tower by the press of circum-
stances, teaches the lawyer judgment.”208  A judge should
continually strive to reach that unique combination.
One of the arguments for pragmatism is that it reveals situations
where doctrines have become so abstract that the “process of com-
partmentalizing legal controversies into existing categories of legal
doctrine carries with it some risk of losing touch with important
features of the underlying issue.”209  These are the different situa-
tions where legal scholars fall back on the ivory towers for answers.
Likewise, the Pragmatist Judge fails to provide a solution because
he lacks any “substantive reference points.”210  The Pragmatist
Judge suffers from the same temptation for excessive abstraction in
206. Id. at 146.  Kearney describes a hermeneutic approach to fiction, history, and
stories in general, yet this mode of interpretation can be applied to our own continu-
ally developing legal history.  This interpretation is important because it recognizes
the past in the context of the present, and is aware of the future consequences.  Kear-
ney writes, “[m]oreover I would insist that in addition to the epistemological criteria
for evaluating rival accounts of history . . . it is necessary to add ethical ones, that is, to
serve justice as well as truth.  We need to invoke as many solid criteria as possible—
linguistic, scientific and moral—if we are able to say that one historical account is
more ‘real’ or ‘true’ or ‘just’ than another . . . .  [a]nd we should be able to say that.”
Id. at 146 (emphases in original).
207. See Edwards, supra note 8, at 314 n.64; see also Luban, supra note 50 and R
accompanying text.
208. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 200, at 169. R
209. Edwards, supra note 8, at 386. R
210. Id. (quoting Gene R. Shreve, Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and the Interdisciplinary
Turn in Legal Criticism:  A Study of Altruistic Judicial Argument, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
41, 65-66 (1998)).  Shreve recognizes that pragmatism cannot provide solutions if it
does not have “substantive reference points.”  He explains, “[p]ragmatism is often
thought to eschew moral (substantive) values, but it must have a moral base some-
where to escape relativism . . . [i]f pragmatism is substantive, does it contradict itself?
If pragmatism lacks substantive reference, is it not hopelessly relativistic?” Id.
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creating categories and relying on empirical evidence that is not
grounded to a hermeneutic understanding of the consequences.
In the Payton cases, the USMS study would create categories to
determine whether the “reason to believe” standard has been satis-
fied.  Courts would refer to these categories to make legal determi-
nations, even though they have no substantive reference to the
constitutional considerations.  Especially in this context, where the
empirical research is most likely to result in conclusions of law re-
garding a person’s rights, the “ivory towers” on both sides of the
spectrum should be avoided.  One of the questions to always con-
sider is what interests are specifically being protected?  Empirical
pragmatism may ensure that the majority of times the police enter
a suspect’s home they will be right, but the courts do not demand
that the police be right. Rather, courts should demand that the po-
lice are able to articulate the reasonableness of their actions.  The
Payton rule is meant to ensure that their actions have been
reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Imagine the perfect judicial system that always resolves contro-
versies according to what is best for society.  Imagine the perfect
judge who always intuitively knows (and is never wrong) what is
best for the individuals standing in his courtroom.  Empirical prag-
matism is a legal theory focused on the idea that judges should
always rule according to the best interests of society (as in our im-
aginary world). This perfect world unfortunately does not exist,
and the question of what is best for society and individuals is more
complicated than the pragmatist theory portrays.  The pragmatic
approach can be compared to an economist’s attempt to discern
the costs and benefits of a rule to society.
Edwards asks the pointed question:  “One might wonder why
those in the business of resolving thorny societal disputes should
not attempt to learn as much about the factual background of the
disputes and the potential consequences of their decisions.”211
There is little doubt that everyone desires judges who are as well-
informed as possible, including any valid empirical research. This
Comment asks whether we wish our “well-informed decision mak-
ers”212 to be Pragmatist Judges, or rather judges that exercise a
“practical wisdom” that will continue the long legal history of this
country as it develops into what society deems best.
211. Edwards, supra note 8, at 318. R
212. Id.
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